We consider allocation rules that choose both an outcome and transfers, based on the agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when agent j could pay agent i to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents. A rule is bribe-proof if such opportunities never arise.
Introduction
Consider the problem of choosing an outcome (e.g., a level of public goods, an allocation of private goods, an assignment of jobs, etc.) and transfers of a private good among agents, based on the way the involved agents value the outcomes (or on other characteristics). Without knowing the agents' valuations, it may not be reasonable for the decision maker to assume that they would truthfully reveal them if doing so is not in their best interest. For example, this is a concern in the literature on strategy-proof allocation rules for public goods economies (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Green and Laffont, 1977; Moulin, 1980) , exchange economies (Hurwicz, 1972; Barberà and Jackson, 1995) , and many other domains. Most of this work addresses this incentives problem at the individual level in combination with standard distributional requirements (e.g., efficiency). Our concern here is to address a group incentives problem in the absence of any distributional requirements.
One compelling group incentive-compatibility requirement is coalitional strategy-proofness: no coalition of agents should be able to jointly misrepresent their valuations (or other characteristics) in a way that results in a direct gain to each of those agents. The desirability of this condition is clear. In many environments, however, this condition is too strong, ruling out all but a few, unreasonable decision rules.
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One way that coalitional strategy-proofness is too strong is that even very large coalitions are prevented from manipulating. The execution of a joint misrepresentation by a large number of agents requires not only that they know each others' valuations, but also that they are able to coordinate their actions. In many situations, it is not practical to worry about such types of manipulation.
On the other hand, if we suspect that a small coalition could manage to coordinate their actions in a profitable, joint misrepresentation of valuations, then they could manage to, additionally, arrange transfers to each other, i.e. they could bribe each other to misrepresent.
To address these two concerns, we formulate the weakest intuitive condition that rules out this type of misrepresentation by coalitions of size two (or one): Only one agent is bribed by one other agent to solely misrepresent his valuations. There are only two agents involved in the transfer, and only one of them misrepresents his type. Decision rules that eliminate the possibility of this type of manipulation-and that are strategy-proof -are called bribe-proof.
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The results apply generally to settings in which the outcomes may represent levels of public goods, allocations of private goods, matching assignments, etc., as long as the agents have a transferable, divisible good with which to bribe each other, and they have continuous preferences that are additive in the transferable good.
The central result is that in a very general setting, if an allocation rule is bribe-proof, then it satisfies a continuity property: The payoff that an agent receives varies continuously with respect to changes in the reported valuations of any other agent.
From this we show that if the set of outcomes is finite, then a bribeproof allocation rule is "essentially" constant, in the sense that an agent's payoff is never affected by a change in any other agent's reported valuations. This result applies not only when all possible valuations of the outcomes are admissible, but also when each agent's set of admissible valuations is a connected set. For the case of an infinite set of outcomes, we derive the same conclusion as long as each agent's set of admissible valuations is "smoothly connected" in the sense of Holmström (1979) , who generalizes the classic characterization of Clarke-Groves mechanisms to such domains.
Finally, we show that if the domain of valuation functions is sufficiently "rich", then a bribe-proof allocation rule must actually be a constant function. In the Conclusion, we discuss the relation between these results and those of Crémer (1996) , who works explicitly in an imperfect information environment. We also discuss broader possible interpretations of our results.
For the case of exactly two public good outcomes (and the unrestricted domain of valuation functions), Green and Laffont (1979) consider manipulations by coalitions of a fixed size in which members make joint misrepresentations, along with transfers among themselves. They show that no Clarke-Groves mechanism is immune to such manipulation by coalitions of any fixed size less than the total number of agents. Our result for finite sets of outcomes and connected domains of valuations is a substantial strengthening of their result for the particular case of manipulation by coalitions with a size of two.
Model
There is a finite set of agents, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, with arbitrary elements i and j. There is a compact set of outcomes, Y ⊆ R , with arbitrary elements y and y . In addition to the outcome, each agent i ∈ N consumes some amount m i ∈ R of a divisible good, say money. An allocation consists of an outcome y ∈ Y and the specification of an amount of money for each agent, m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ).
Each agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear (i.e. linear additively separable) preference ordering over Y × R. We will assume that these preferences can be parameterized in a continuous way by a set, Θ i ⊆ R k , of admissible types. That is, for each i ∈ N , there is a continuous valuation function, 
When Y is finite, one could imagine the set of types being R |Y |−1 , and that a type represents an agent's normalized valuations of the public outcomes. More generally, the set may also describe other characteristics of an agent. When modeling a certain class of economies, such a parameterization may not be unique. All that is required for our results to hold is that such a continuous parameterization exists. The assumption that Y and Θ i are subsets of Euclidean spaces was made to avoid the distraction of topological generality.
A domain is a cross-product of type sets Θ ≡ Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n . For any i ∈ N , we use the standard notation θ −i ∈ Θ −i to refer to a list of types for agents other than i.
Some of the results apply to domains that are connected: The domain Θ is connected if for all i ∈ N , Θ i is a path-connected set, i.e., for all θ i , θ i ∈ Θ i , there exists a continuous function f :
Our general allocation problem then is a specification of N , Y , Θ, and
an allocation for any profile of admissible types. It will be convenient to decompose the solution into two functions,ȳ: Θ → Y andm: Θ → R n , in which case we write ϕ ≡ (ȳ,m). It will also be convenient to write, for any agent i ∈ N , ϕ i (θ) ≡ (ȳ(θ),m i (θ)) to refer to agent i's consumption bundle. Depending on the interpretation of the model, one may wish to additionally impose certain feasibility conditions on a solution, such as weak budget balance (for all θ ∈ Θ, m i (θ) ≤ M , where M is some aggregate endowment of money), or strong budget balance ( m i (θ) = M ). Such requirements have no effect on our results, so we will not address them.
The Bribing Condition
If the agents are reporting their types to a planner who is using a given solution, it is of interest to know whether the solution satisfies certain incentive compatibility properties. For instance, it is desirable for a solution to be such that an agent of type θ i can do no better for himself than by reporting his true type θ i to the planner, regardless of the other agents' types. That is, a solution should satisfy the following condition.
Strategy-proof:
The solution ϕ = (ȳ,m) is strategy-proof if for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ N , there exists no θ i ∈ Θ i such that Holmström (1979) shows that on most connected domains, the only strategyproof solutions that maximize i v i (y; θ i ) for every profile θ are ClarkeGroves mechanisms.
As discussed in the Introduction, we also wish to rule out the possibility that an agent could bribe another to misrepresent his type. We formulate a condition that rules out this type of situation.
Bribe-proof:
The solution ϕ = (ȳ,m) is bribe-proof if for all θ ∈ Θ and all i, j ∈ N , there exists no b ∈ R and θ i ∈ Θ i such that
The interpretation is that j bribes i with b units of money to misrepresent his type. Notice that by choosing i = j and b = 0, bribe-proofness implies strategy-proofness.
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At this point, a few points are worth mentioning. First, we are implicitly assuming that the two agents would trust each other in arranging this misrepresentation; that is, j would not break his promise to pay i, and i would not renege on his promise to misrepresent. Therefore, the results of this paper should be seen as a comment on the planner's "worst-case scenario" in which agents completely trust each other. See Tirole (1992) for a discussion of the assumption. We will discuss a departure from this assumption in the Conclusion.
Second, note that we do not allow j to also misrepresent his type. Since we are determining the consequences of our condition (which in some instances are strong), the results are stronger using our weaker definition.
Third, we are implicitly assuming that the divisible good is perfectly transferable among agents. Perhaps instead, when j sends b units of money, i only receives λb < b of it (e.g. due to some transaction cost). All of our results continue to hold as long as λ > 0.
Results
Consider the following example of a domain for which there exist non-trivial bribe-proof solutions.
A bribe-proof solution ϕ = (ȳ,m) can be constructed by lettingm be constant and lettingȳ be defined as a median voter rule (Moulin, 1980) , e.g., if |N | is odd, letȳ(θ) be the median of θ 1 , . . . , θ n .
We will point out particular attributes of this example in Sections 3.2-3.3 that have allowed us to construct non-trivial bribe-proof solutions. First, however, note that under any of these solutions, an agent's payoff varies continuously as any other agent varies his reported type. We first show that this is a general property of bribe-proof solutions.
Continuity
Our analysis concerns the effect of a change in the report of an agent's type on a given bribe-proof solution. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, we fix the following.
• an agent i ∈ N (potentially the bribee),
• an agent j ∈ N \ {i} (potentially the briber), and
The set of bundles that agent i can obtain by varying his type is his option set:
With respect to any θ i ∈ Θ i , define the maximum payoff that i may receive, and his set of best obtainable bundles, as follows.
We first show that since ϕ is strategy-proof, u * i must be a continuous function.
5 If Y is finite, this follows from a direct application of the Maxi-mum Theorem. In the general case, however, the option setŌ i may not be compact, and the Maximum Theorem can not be directly applied.
The following lemma shows that on any compact set of types, an agent's option set-in particular, the amount of the divisible good that he receivesis bounded.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Y is compact, Θ i is compact, and ϕ is strategyproof.
Therefore, agent i's option set on a compact domain is a bounded set. It may not, however, be closed. To deal with that technical difficulty, define the following analogs of u *
Suppose that Y is compact, Θ i is compact, and ϕ is strategy-proof. Then u It should be noted that this proposition is more of a technical result than an applied one. The function u * i measures the payoff to agent i from reporting type θ i when his true type is θ i . The proposition states that when this report and true type are varied together, the resulting payoff is continuous. The proposition does not imply general continuity resulting from varying a report with respect to a fixed true type.
Secondly, note that since u * i is continuous on any compact (sub)domain, it is continuous on any domain (see the proof of Corollary 1).
For all θ i ∈ Θ i , define the payoff that j receives as follows.
The central result is that u * j is a continuous function of agent i's reported type. One way to demonstrate this fact is as follows.
8 Bribe-proofness requires agent i to maximize the sum u * i +u * j through his reported type. Viewing this sum as a pseudo-payoff for agent i, bribe-proofness implies a strategyproofness with respect to this pseudo-payoff. Hence it follows from Proposition 1 that this sum is continuous, and hence so is u * j . Below we provide an alternate formal proof. 
, and the continuity of v implies that v i (y; θ k ) converges to v i (y;θ i ).
Case 2: There exists a sequence {θ 
Finally, note that the assumption of a compact type-space was only needed temporarily. 
One may check thatφ is bribe-proof, but that neither u * 1 nor u * 2 is continuous at θ 1 = 0. A similar example can be constructed in which Y is bounded but open.
Finite Sets of Public Outcomes
Consider again the bribe-proof solutions in Example 1. Suppose that instead of being able to choose any point in some interval [a, b] , we may only choose integer points in the interval, e.g. Y = {1, 2, 3}. Median-voter types of solutions are well-defined in this setting also, subject to some tie-breaking procedure when the "median voter" is indifferent between two elements of Y . such solutions are, however, no longer bribe-proof ! Informally, when the median voter is indifferent (or almost indifferent) between two elements of Y , he could be bribed to misreport his preferences. The reader is left to check this.
A trivial example of a bribe-proof solution for this environment is a constant solution. The discouraging news is that for connected domains in general, if Y is finite, then this is essentially the only type of bribe-proof solution.
The following example illustrates why we say it is essentially so.
Example 3 (Two Outcomes) Consider two agents in neighboring offices, each having his own air conditioner which can be turned on or off. An agent's type represents the value of having the air conditioner in his own office turned on. Let N = {1, 2}, Y = {On, Off} 2 , and Θ 1 = Θ 2 = R. Furthermore, while agent 2 has a quiet air conditioner, agent 1 has a noisy one, which annoys agent 2 if it is turned on. So, the agents' valuation functions satisfy, for all θ 1 ∈ Θ 1 and θ 2 ∈ Θ 2 ,
The following "natural" solution, in which agent 2 has control over his air conditioner and agent 1 compensates agent 2 if he uses his, is bribe-proof.
For the solution in Example 3, agent 2 plays the role of a dictator over the second dimension of the outcome space (the status of his own air conditioner). This is compatible with bribe-proofness because agent 1 has "trivial" preferences over that dimension-his preferences are unaffected by the status of that air conditioner. Similarly, agent 2 has trivial preferences over the first dimension of Y -regardless of his type, he always is one unit worse off when agent 1's air conditioner is on. Agent 1 plays the role of a dictator on that dimension, subject to the constraint that agent 2 be indifferent between any "choices" agent 1 has.
For connected domains and finite sets of outcomes, this is in fact a consequence of bribe-proofness-when the solution is responsive to a change in an agent's type, the change must not affect any other agent's payoff. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that Y is finite, Θ is a connected domain, and
We have shown that each θ i ∈ Θ i is a local maximizer of u * j . Therefore, since Θ i is path-connected and u * j is continuous (Corollary 1, u * j is constant (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Theorem 2 implies that under a bribe-proof solution, each agent is actually a dictator on the range of the solution. Formally, the solution must satisfy the following condition.
All-Dictatorial : The solutionφ = (ȳ,m) is all-dictatorial if for all θ, θ ∈ Θ and all
The Corollary follows directly from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Y is finite and Θ is a connected domain. Then ϕ is bribe-proof if and only if ϕ is all-dictatorial.
A relevant concept here is Hurwicz and Walker's (1990) notion of a "decomposable" domain. When each agent cares only about his own dimension of the outcome space (i.e., the domain is decomposable), it is a trivial matter to define bribe-proof solutions. They can even be efficient, but they need not be anything close to "constant", as in Example 3. When there is a "conflict of interest" between agents (and the domain is indecomposable), however, the condition (all-dictatorial ) is much stronger. For example, in Section 3.4 we examine a class of domains for which this conflict of interests always exists, and derive an even stronger conclusion.
The next result follows from Corollary 2.
Corollary 3 Suppose that Y is finite, Θ is a connected domain, and ϕ
Before concluding this section, note that even if a domain of interest is not connected, the results could be applied to each "connected component" of the domain, that is, each subdomain that itself forms a connected domain. For example, if a 2-agent domain consisted of four connected components, Theorem 2 implies that under a bribe-proof solution, there are four pairs of payoffs, each associated with one of the components.
Smooth Preferences
Consider once again the solutions described in Example 1. Note that each single-peaked valuation function has a slope of 1 to the left of its peak and a slope of −1 to the right. As we did originally, let Y = R, but now suppose that the domain was such that "steeper" and "flatter" single-peaked valuation functions were also admissible. Again, the median-voter types of solutions are well-defined in such a setting. They are not, however, bribeproof. If the median voter has a relatively flat valuation function, he cares less about the location of y, relative to his transfer, than do agents with steeper valuation functions, hence he can be bribed. Similarly, if valuation functions were smooth, the same problem would arise: The median voter would have a "locally flat" valuation function at his peak, and could be bribed to make at least a small misrepresentation.
In fact, Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 generalize to the case in which Y is infinite, as long as the domain is "smoothly" connected, in the sense of Holmström (1979) . That is, there should exist a smooth, one-dimensional parameterization of some path between any two types:
Smoothly Connected: The domain Θ is smoothly connected if for all i ∈ N and all θ i , θ i ∈ Θ i , there exists w:
v. There exists z ∈ R such that for all y ∈ Y and all x ∈ [0, 1],
One may check that the domain of Example 1 can not be parameterized in this way, so it is not smoothly connected. On the other hand, if v i is differentiable in Θ i for all i ∈ N , then any convex Θ is smoothly connected.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Θ is a smoothly connected domain and ϕ is
Proof: As in the definition of smoothly connected domains, let w be defined with respect to Θ i , and for all x ∈ [0, 1], let θ
Strategy-proofness implies that for all x ∈ [0, 1],
Bribe-proofness implies that for all x ∈ [0, 1],
Since Θ is smoothly connected, the Lemma in the Appendix of Holmström (1979) states that (1) and (2) imply that u * j is constant.
As in the previous section, this result can be used to derive the following.
Corollary 4 Suppose that Θ is a smoothly connected domain. Then ϕ is bribe-proof if and only if ϕ is all-dictatorial.
Corollary 5 Suppose that Θ is a smoothly connected domain and ϕ is bribe-proof. For all θ, θ ∈ Θ, if ϕ(θ) = (y, m) and ϕ(θ ) = (y, m ), then m = m .
Rich Domains
One might observe that in the above examples in which non-constant bribeproof solutions exist, the domains are, loosely speaking, "narrow". For example, they don't contain many perturbations of the functions they contain. It turns out that if a domain is rich enough, then in fact only constant functions are bribe-proof.
We will use the following definition of richness, which requires that if a valuation function is admissible, then for any outcome y ∈ Y , there exists another admissible valuation function for which the value of y, relative to any other outcome, is strictly greater than for the original function.
Monotonically Closed: The domain Θ is monotonically closed if for all
i ∈ N , all θ i ∈ Θ i , and all y ∈ Y , there exists
Theorem 4 Suppose that Θ is connected and monotonically closed. Further, suppose that either Y is finite or Θ is smoothly connected. If ϕ is bribe-proof, then it is a constant function.
Proof: We will prove the theorem for the case in which Y is finite by using the results of Section 3.2. The proof for the case in which Θ is smoothly connected is the same but uses the results of Section 3.3.
Suppose by contradiction that there exist distinct (y, m) and (y , m ) in the range of ϕ. By Corollary 3, y = y , so without loss of generality we have (y, m i ), (y , m i ) ∈Ō i with y = y . In this proof we will change agent j's type (from θ j ). To simplify notation, let ϕ = (ȳ,m) depend only on the types of agents i and j.
Since agent i receives (y , m i ) for some reported type, and since Θ is monotonically closed, there exists θ i ∈ Θ i such that
Corollary 2 implies that for
Theorem 2 implies
With eqns. (5) and (6), this implies ϕ j (θ i , θ j ) = (y, m j ), so by Corollary 3,
Similarly, Theorem 2 implies
With eqns. (4) and (7), this implies v i (y;
Conclusion
We have presented a generalized model in which agents have quasi-linear preferences over outcomes and transfers, and shown that in many situations (domains), it is essentially impossible to design a non-trivial solution immune to manipulation by pairs of agents when they can make transfers. The specification of the model is such that the simplest interpretation of an outcome is as a public decision, such as a level of public goods. Through the correct specification of a domain, however, there are applications of this model to many other environments. Examples include auctions, more general allocation problems with indivisible goods, 10 matching problems with money, queuing problems, exchange economies with or without production, and voting models.
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Our concept of manipulation is defined in such a way as to rule out situations in which two agents with given types could manipulate a solution. This condition is most readily applied to situations in which agents have complete information about each others' types. It should be noted, however, that the results apply even to cases in which agents have partial information.
12 For example, it may be the case that agents only know the types of their "neighbors." In such a case, our results apply to the payoff of an agent (only) with respect to changes in his neighbors reported type. As another example, it may be the case that an agent can identify a second agent's type only when that type is in some given subset of types. Again in such a case, our results apply locally, regarding the agent's payoff with respect to changes in the second agent's type within that subset of types. We leave the formalization of such results to the reader.
Of additional interest is a result by Crémer (1996) regarding the manipulability of Clarke-Groves mechanisms by groups of agents for the case of exactly two outcomes (|Y | = 2). The remainder of the section is dedicated to an informal discussion of Crémer's result for groups of two agents, and the way our two sets of results together establish a boundary between possibility and impossibility at the point where agents gain information about each others' types.
Crémer's setup is as follows. Imagine that a Clarke-Groves mechanism is being used, and that all of the agents except, say, i and j have already reported their types to the mechanism (so interpret them as fixed). Further, 10 See Schummer (1999) for a version of Theorem 2 in such an environment. 11 For example, to model a simple 2-good exchange economy in which preferences are quasi-linear in the first good, the set of "public outcomes" is a simplex representing the division of the second good among the agents.
12 I thank a referee for drawing attention to this point.
imagine that agents i and j do not know each other's types, but anticipate the possibility of gains by jointly misrepresenting their types and making an internal transfer. Since they do not know each others' types, they coordinate their potential misrepresentation by devising a "sub-mechanism", to which they report their types, and which determines for them (i) a (mis-)report of their types to be made to the original Clarke-Groves mechanism, and (ii) a transfer to be made between the two. The question is whether a pair of agents could devise such a submechanism that is itself strategy-proof. The answer is sometimes: Crémer (1996) provides some Clarke-Groves mechanisms that are immune to such manipulation by pairs of agents.
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One may think that Theorem 2 contradicts Crémer's result with the following reasoning: If a Clarke-Groves mechanism is not bribe-proof, as shown by Theorem 2, then why can we not design a sub-mechanism for some pair of agents, as above, to implement this bribe, violating the result of Crémer? The answer is that such a sub-mechanism would be manipulable by one of the two agents-one of the two agents cheating the system will be cheated by the other agent.
For a precise example, consider a Clarke-Groves mechanism, which is not bribe-proof : For some types θ ∈ Θ, agent j can successfully bribe agent i with b units of money to mis-report his type as θ i . In order to take advantage of this, one may propose the following Crémer-style sub-mechanism for the two agents: Given that the other agents have reported types θ −ij , whenever i and j report (θ i , θ j ) to the sub-mechanism, the sub-mechanism recommends the mis-report (θ i , θ j ) plus a transfer of b to be made from j to i. In all other cases, the sub-mechanism recommends no misrepresentation and no transfer.
Is this sub-mechanism strategy-proof ? It is simple to check that in most cases, this sub-mechanism can not be manipulated. However, when their types are (θ i , θ j ), agent i can mis-report to the sub-mechanism that he is of type θ i ; the sub-mechanism then recommends the "mis-report" (θ i , θ j ) to the Clarke-Groves mechanism (which is what i would have reported anyway) plus a transfer of b to agent i, resulting in a gain to agent i. Hence this is not a strategy-proof sub-mechanism.
More generally, Crémer's result tells us that for a particular class of Clarke-Groves mechanisms, there is no strategy-proof sub-mechanism that allows a pair of agents to take advantage of any such bribing situation.
The essential difference between bribe-proofness and Crémer's manipulation condition is in the need for agents to know each other's types. Under the stronger condition of bribe-proofness, a manipulation is considered possible if there is any situation in which a pair of agents could gain through the bribing procedure-this applies most readily to situations in which agents have information (see above) about each others' types. But for a pair of agents to be able to gain with a sub-mechanism, they must devise a plan of manipulation that covers all possible realizations of their types, and it must be immune to further manipulation by any of the two individuals.
Since the two concepts are similar except for their respective implicit assumptions regarding the information agents have about each others' preferences, the two sets of results could be seen as a dividing line between the possibility and the impossibility of having solutions that are non-manipulable by coalitions (or at least pairs) of agents. Possibility obtains even among the class of Clarke-Groves mechanisms as soon as potentially misrepresenting agents lose the information of each other's types in a simple public goods environment. With more information, however, manipulation is possible under almost any solution, in many different kinds of environments.
then either there exists a non-local-maximizer or there exists a non-localminimizer, but not necessarily both. For example, consider the function f (x) = 0 for x = 1 and f (1) = 1; every x is a local maximizer.
Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 Suppose that Y is finite and Θ is a connected domain. Then ϕ is bribe-proof if and only if ϕ is all-dictatorial.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that for some θ, θ ∈ Θ and k ∈ N ,
By repeated application of Theorem 2,
contradicting strategy-proofness.
Coalitional Strategy-proofness
It is simple to observe that any all-dictatorial solution is also coalitionally strategy-proof. Therefore on any domain of the types discussed in Sections 3.2-3.4, bribe-proofness implies coalitional strategy-proofness. The following trivial example shows, however, that this logical relation does not hold in general. Also note that this rule is not efficient; hence bribe-proofness does not even imply efficiency.
